

Routes to tour in Germany

The Harz and Heath Route




German roads will get you there — to areas at times so attractive that one route leads to the next, from the Harz mountains to the Lüneburg Heath, say. Maybe you should take a look at both.

The Harz, northernmost part of the Mittelgebirge range, is holiday country all the year round. In summer for hikers, in winter for skiers in their tens of thousands. Tour from the hill resorts of Osterode, Clausthal-Zellerfeld or Bad Harzburg or from the 1,000-

year-old town of Goslar. The Heath extends from Celle, with its town centre of half-timbered houses unscathed by the war and the oldest theatre in Germany, to Lüneburg, also 1,000 years old. It boasts wide expanses of flat countryside, purple heather and herds of local curly-horned sheep.

Visit Germany and let the Harz and Heath Route be your guide.



- 1 Brunswick
- 2 An old Lüneburg Heath farmhouse
- 3 The Harz
- 4 Göttingen

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Big powers still bogged down on key issues

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Moscow is playing East-West relations rather coolly, pessimistically and a bit stand offish. Washington is torn between demonstrative White House optimism and Congress demands for greater disarmament.

It seems that White House optimism is gaining the upper hand.

The expert-level talks paving the way for the second meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachov have been referred to by both sides as "serious, substantial and to-the-point."

There are some encouraging trends in the East-West game: agreement has been reached on an extensive exchange programme for schoolchildren, students, scientists, artists and sportsmen.

Another pleasant feature is that the governments have not again slipped into the icy rhetoric which poisoned the political atmosphere during the first years of the Reagan Administration.

Progress has been made compared with 1984/85. But there is a list of steps backward as well.

This list is headed by President Reagan's announcement not to respect the

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provisions of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) as of 1987.

There is also uncertainty about the future of the anti-ballistic missile treaty (ABM). The ABM treaty, which was drawn up in 1972, is still the most effective barrier against Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), since it bans the testing and deployment of space-based defence weapons.

A third point which has particularly annoyed Moscow is Reagan's renewed refusal to join the Soviet test ban moratorium which has just been extended until the end of the year.

Soviet behaviour has also worsened

the situation because of their vague information on the use of radar facilities near Krasnojorsk or the encodement of data during missile tests.

If all these aspects are included in the assessment the situation looks less positive.

It at least becomes clear that there is a reason for the scepticism expressed by Soviet newspapers and officials.

Americans and Soviets have made headway in marginal fields, but there are no signs of tangible progress on key issues.

The only thing they have reached agreement on is the objective formulated by their foreign ministers Shultz and Gromyko and confirmed at last year's summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachov that negotiations are being conducted to "prevent an arms race in space and to end it on earth..."

The fact that this common realisation has not yet led to concrete action is a result of the deep mistrust which President Reagan in particular has with regard to the Kremlin and arms control.

What other reason can there be for his unwillingness to budge from his dream of a reliable technological response to inter-continental missiles — SDI?

He is wary of the political response, namely to reduce the number of strategic arms via corresponding agreements with the other side.

He again made this clear this month by pointing out that (SDI) technology gives both sides the possibility of reducing their arms arsenals without jeopardising their own security.

"The risk that one side might cheat by retaining more missiles than agreed upon, Reagan added, could be eliminated via effective defence. Reagan also left no doubts about his intentions:

"When the time has come and research is ready, we shall deploy." The

The Soviet Union has announced it is to continue its unilateral ban on nuclear tests until the end of the year.

When the Soviet party boss, Mikhail Gorbachov, explained why he thought an extension was the right decision, he gave the impression that there had been opposition to it in the Soviet Union.


He had managed to prevail and persuade the Politburo to approve the decision.

The Soviet Union began its self-imposed ban a year ago. It was to have expired on August 6.

Speaking on television, Gorbachov said an extended ban might lead to a bilateral agreement during a summit meeting with President Reagan.

Gorbachov chose his words carefully. He did not say that a bilateral agreement was a precondition for a new summit.

Instead, it became clear that he would be satisfied if the summit resulted in an agreement. This is the political crux of Gorbachov's statement.



(Cartoon: Walter Hanel-Kühner-Stadt Anzeiger)

Soviet Union, which has also been conducting military space research for years. See this as the critical aspect.

In their eyes, a deployment of SDI systems would mean extending the arms race to space and thus renouncing the Shultz-Gromyko formula.

Since Reagan seems unwilling to talk about this subject the disarmament dialogue has come to a standstill.

The vision of an invulnerable and "missile-proof" United States is preventing negotiators in Geneva from making greater efforts to ease the already critical nuclear arms situation.

For as long as it seems possible to undermine an SDI system by increasing the number of missiles the chances of the "big deal" are poor.

This need not of course mean that further progress is impossible.

The problems relating to SDI and ABM as well as the reduction of strategic arsenals could be shelved until Washington really knows what it wants.

The aim behind renewal of Soviet test ban

So far the United States has always stated that the continuation of its underground nuclear tests is not only aimed at modernising its nuclear weapons arsenal, where it feels it has some technological catching up to do, but is also necessary in terms of SDI research.

This would now seem to be the decisive motive for Gorbachov's call for an end to nuclear tests.

If he were able to mobilise public pressure on President Reagan, and he seems to have achieved some success in this respect in Congress, he might feel that an end to American nuclear tests would decisively

In the meantime practical steps could be taken at other levels, such as nuclear medium-range weapons, the ban on chemical weapons, troop reduction talks in Vienna and the CSCE conference in Stockholm.

These are all ways of creating a situation in which a compromise could be reached on strategic arms stability.

This will not be possible during Reagan's period in office, but will be possible when his successor comes along.

Gorbachov is not the only one forced to start saving.

In view of the huge deficit and public debt in America Congress is also starting to pull the emergency brake.

Technological solutions are, unfortunately, very expensive.

Realisation of this fact already made it easier to do without certain anti-ballistic missile system during the seventies.

Wolfgang Schmieg
(Nürnberg Nachrichten, 19 August 1986)

weaken the SDI programme. Contrary to the common assumption, however, this would not increase the incentive for genuine disarmament, but reduce that incentive.

Gorbachov would not then need to make specific promises on actual disarmament in order to achieve a limitation of the American SDI programme.

In this sense if Gorbachov concentrates on his popularity-conscious call for a ban on nuclear tests this need not necessarily be a positive sign.

Such an approach could indicate that Gorbachov is unwilling to take any further-reaching steps towards disarmament, at least not while Ronald Reagan is president.

Gorbachov wants to bind the Reagan Administration. He then hopes to achieve the kind of agreement he really wants in negotiations with Reagan's successor.

A great deal at least would support this sceptical interpretation.

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 20 August 1986)

